Lewis H. Brereton

Lewis Hyde Brereton (June 21, 1890 – July 20, 1967) was a military aviation pioneer and lieutenant general in the United States Air Force.

Quotes

• Two messages from the War Department alerted us to the possibility of an attack by Japan at any hour.
  • Diary entry, Manila, Philippines (November 30, 1941)
  • See Attack on Pearl Harbor

• I grabbed the phone and talked to General Sutherland, who informed me that the Japs had bombed Pearl Harbor ... and that a state of war existed. It came as a surprise to no one.
  • Diary entry, Manila (December 8, 1941)

• The force of 164 bombers roared at tree-top level through a curtain of ground fire and, in some cases, concentrated attacks by enemy fighters. Explosions of boilers and gas-storage tanks spread flame and smoke. ...
  Liberators flew so low that they dipped their wings through tree tops. One plane actually brought back pieces of corn stalks in its bomb bay. ... One boiler house exploded so violently that it destroyed a Liberator flying over the target. Many of the men said that it became almost unbearably hot in their planes as they flew through the wall of flames, licking 300 feet and higher.
  • Diary entry, Benghazi, Libya (August 1, 1943)
  • See Operation Tidal Wave

• The German progress with jet aircraft places them way ahead of us in this field. If they can make them in sufficient strength they may become a serious threat to our deep heavy-bomber penetration.
  • Diary entry, Normandy, France (July 30, 1944)

• Despite the failure of the 2nd Army to get through to Arnhem and establish a permanent bridgehead over the Lower Rhine, Operation Market was a brilliant success. The 101st Division took all its objectives as planned; the 82nd Division dominated the southern end of the bridge at Nijmegen until noon of D-plus-l, by which time it had been planned for the Guards Armored to be there; the 1st British Division similarly dominated the Arnhem bridge from its northern end until noon of D-plus-3, 24 hours later than the time set for the arrival of the 2nd Army. Hence the airborne troops accomplished what was expected of them. It was the breakdown of the 2nd Army’s timetable on the first day—their failure to reach Endhoven in 6 to 8 hours as planned—that caused the delay in the taking of the Nijmegen bridge and the failure at Arnhem.
  • Report to General George Marshall and General Henry H. Arnold (October 3, 1944)
  • See Operation Market Garden

External links

• The Brereton Diaries (W. Morrow & Co., 1946)