In law, an appeal is a process for requesting a formal change to an official decision.
The Dictionary of Legal Quotations (1904)Edit
- Quotes reported in James William Norton-Kyshe, The Dictionary of Legal Quotations (1904), p. 13-15.
- It is the glory and happiness of our excellent constitution, that to prevent any injustice no man is to be concluded by the first judgment; but that if he apprehends himself to be aggrieved, he has another Court to which he can resort for relief; for this purpose the law furnishes him with appeals, with writs of error and false judgment.
- John Pratt, L.C.J., King v. Chancellor, &c, of the University of Cambridge (1720), 1 Str. Rep. 564.
- A number of American authorities were cited in the course of the argument, which may be briefly noticed, seeing that they were made the subject of comment in both Courts below.
- Lord Watson, Huntington v. Attrill, 62 L. J. Rep. P. C. C. 1893, p. 49.
- In coming to that conclusion, as I do upon principle, I am much strengthened by the American authorities to which my attention has been called.
- Fry, J., Steel v. Dixon (1881), L. R. 17 C. D. 831, 50 L. J. Ch. 593.
- A rule of such general adoption shows that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the relative rights and duties of principal and surety, and that it accords with a common sense of justice and the natural equity of mankind.
- Chancellor Kent, Hayes v. Ward (1819), 4 Johns. (U.S.) Ch. Rep. 132.
- I think it beyond question that it is generally the duty of an appellate Judge to leave undisturbed a decision of which he does not clearly disapprove. I conceive that, in our Court, as in the civil law, it is the rule that "gravely to doubt is to affirm."
- Knight Bruce, L.J., The Attorney-General v. The Corporation of Beverley (1854), 24 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Part 7, Chan. p. 376.
- It is needless to enter into many reasons for quashing the conviction, when one alone is fully sufficient.
- Lord Mansfield, Rex v. Jarvis (1756), 1 Burr. Part IV., p. 152.
- It has not been deemed improper by the best of Judges to say that it would be a satisfaction not to them only, but to the profession at large, if a point of novelty and difficulty were taken to the Court of Appeal.
- Kekeioich, J., In re England, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. , p. 109.
- If no appeal were possible, I have no great hesitation in saying that this would not be a desirable country to live in. . . . It is quite true that there is enough difficulty in appealing as it is; but if there is to be no appeal at all possible the system would be intolerable.
- Bowen, L.J., The Queen v. Justices of County of London, &c. (1893), L.R. 2Q.B. 492.
- A decision of the House of Lords requires no sanction.
- Kekewich, J., In re Weall Andrews v. Weall (1889), L. R. 42 Ch. D. 679.
- A solemn decision of a competent Judge is by no means to be disregarded, and I ought not to overrule it without being clearly satisfied in my own mind that the decision is erroneous.
- Lord Longdaie, M.R., Ward v. Painter (1839), 2 Beav. 93.
- I should be desirous that my opinion should not be conclusive on the parties, if there were any mode by which our judgment could be reviewed in a Court of error.
- Lord Kenyon, C.J., Petrie v. White (1789), 3 T. R. 9.
- I am desirous that the case should be brought under the consideration of a higher tribunal, without any unnecessary delay, and to afford every facility in my power for the correction of any error into which I may have fallen.
- Lord Langdale, M.R., Tullett v. Armstrong (1838), 1 Beav. 31.
- It is a great satisfaction for me to find, that this matter will undergo investigation elsewhere, before it is finally decided.
- Lord Langdale, M.R., Wilson v. Eden (1850), 12 Beav. 459.
- I trust I have not misinterpreted the views of the Court of Appeal in a matter of so much importance, and, further, that if I have, any misconceptions of mine may be speedily removed by the decision of a higher tribunal.
- Stirling, J., Verner v. General, &c. Trust (1894), L. R. 2 C. D. , p. 260.
- A decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is conclusive, and binds the House in subsequent cases. An erroneous decision can be set right only by an Act of Parliament.
- London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council (1898), L. R. Ap. Ca. , 375.